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Abstract: Conventional wisdom suggests that lobbying is the preferred 
mean for exerting political influence in rich countries and corruption the 
preferred one in poor countries. Analyses of their joint effects are 
understandably rare. This paper provides a theoretical framework that focus 
on the relationship between lobbying and corruption (that is, it investigates 
under what conditions they are complements or substitutes). The paper also 
offers novel econometric evidence on lobbying, corruption and influence 
using data for about 4000 firms in 25 transition countries. Our results show 
that (a) lobbying and corruption are substitutes, if anything; (b) firm size, 
age, ownership, per capita GDP and political stability are important 
determinants of lobby membership; and (c) lobbying seems to be a much 
more effective instrument for political influence than corruption, even in 
poorer, less developed countries. 
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1. Introduction 
What is the relationship between lobbying and corruption? In a general sense, both are ways 
of obtaining help from the public sector in exchange for some favor. Indeed one could argue 
that lobbying is just a special form of corruption focused on legislative bodies or some other 
rule-making agency.
1 There are, however, several important differences. One first difference 
is that lobbying does not always take the form of bribes or even of campaign contributions. In 
many cases, lobbyists have expertise that politicians don’t have and can influence politicians 
by strategically sharing this expertise with them (see Austen-Smith and Wright 1994 for an 
example). In other cases, lobbyists can influence politicians by providing endorsements or by 
threatening to provide voters with damaging information about them or their policies 
(Grossman and Helpman 1999 and 2001). These differences have received little attention in 
the theoretical literature: two exceptions are Bennedsen and Feldmann (2005) and Dahm and 
Porteiro (2004), who compare the choice of lobbying with monetary payments or bribing to 
the choice of strategic provision of information to politicians. 
The fact that lobbying is mainly aimed at policy-making institutions rather than the 
bureaucracy brings up a second difference since legislatures both set the policies that 
lobbyists care about and the rules that make it either easier or more difficult to bribe. Thus, 
lobbying can be both an activity that makes bribing irrelevant if it succeeds in influencing 
policy and an activity that makes bribing easier if it succeeds in undermining law 
enforcement. In other words, lobbying can be a substitute for, or a complement to, corruption. 
These two alternative interpretations of lobbying as a substitute or a complement to bribes 
have been investigated by two recent papers by Harstad and Svensson (2005) and Damania et 
al. (2004) respectively.  
                                                 
1 Much of the theoretical literature on lobbying seems to adopt this position. In many models, e.g. 
Grossman and Helpman (2001), lobbying is modeled as monetary transfers from lobbyists to 
politicians and these transfers could equally be interpreted as campaign contributions or bribes. See 
Coate and Morris (1999) or Yalcin and Damania (2005) for examples of the latter interpretation.    
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In this paper, we focus on this distinction and bring some empirical evidence to bear 
on the issue.
2 Although the literature on lobbying is large and growing, the attendant 
empirical evidence is scarce, mostly limited to developed countries and either focuses on firm 
characteristics (e.g., size and sector) as main determinant of lobbying within a specific 
country or on macroeconomic variables such as per-capita GDP in cross-country 
comparisons.
3 Here instead, we investigate lobbying, corruption and influence by examining 
firm characteristics as well as institutional features of the countries in which these firms 
operate. One advantage of focusing on the transition countries is that they provide an almost 
natural experiment setting in the sense that they started out with similar political institutions 
but implemented different economic and political reforms. Focusing on this set of countries is 
also important because they are often perceived to be among the most corrupt in the world 
(Kaufman et al., 1999) and are therefore countries in which few analysts would expect that 
lobbying would be able to play an important role.  
Our analysis focus on two main questions: (a) what are the factors that determine the 
likelihood of a firm being a member of a lobby group? And (b) what is the relative role of 
corruption and lobby membership in explaining the probability of a firm seeing itself as 
influential vis-à-vis government laws, regulations and policies?  Using 1999 survey data for 
3,954 firms in 25 transition economies, our results show that, in addition to the factors 
highlighted in the literature, there is substantial evidence that lobbying and corruption are 
substitutes. That is, lobbying is an important alternative instrument of influence to corruption 
in transition countries. Our analysis also suggests that political institutions have a significant 
effect on lobbying. In particular, we find that lobbying is more likely to occur in 
parliamentary systems and in systems that enjoy high levels of political stability. Finally, we 
examine the relative effects of lobbying and corruption in terms of the production of political 
                                                 
2 A third important distinction between lobbying and corruption is that the latter is often illegal. 
3 Examples of these empirical literatures are Mitra et al. (2002) and Bischof (2003), respectively.   
  3
influence. First, we find that although lobbying is jointly determined with influence, 
corruption is not. Second, we find that the effect of lobbying on influence is always 
statistically significant, while that on corruption seldom is (independently of how we measure 
the latter). And third, and most importantly, we find that the size of the effect of lobbying is 
much larger than that of corruption. These findings support the notion that lobbying seems to 
be a considerably more effective way for firms to exert political influence than corruption. In 
this light, we argue that future research will do well in paying attention to lobbying activities 
when researching corruption as a competing medium of influence in poor countries.   
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section two, we articulate more 
precisely the theoretical underpinnings of our empirical analysis. In section three, we describe 
the data and our empirical methodology while in section four we discuss our econometric 
results. Section five concludes.  
 
2. Theoretical framework 
Corruption and lobbying have been extensively analyzed in the literature.
4 However, while 
these are clearly related phenomena, there have been very few attempts to investigate the 
relationship between them and the two literatures are quite distinct. One significant exception 
is recent work by Harstad and Svensson (2005). In their model, firms can gain influence by 
lobbying politicians or by bribing bureaucrats. The difference is that with lobbying, firms can 
get politicians to change the rules to their advantage while by bribing bureaucrats firms can 
only hope to stop the latter from enforcing the rules. Thus, in this framework, corruption and 
lobbying are substitutes. The first key assumption in the paper is that while bureaucrats who 
take bribes cannot commit not to ask for bribes again in the future, a change in the rules 
themselves through politician intervention is much more difficult to overcome. In other 
                                                 
4 See Drazen (2000), Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Grossman and Helpman (2001) for surveys of 
the extensive theoretical work on lobbying, while Potters and Sloof (1996) survey the empirical 
literature. Bardhan (1997), Aidt (2003) and Svensson (2005) survey the work on corruption.    
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words, through lobbying politicians, a firm is much more assured that in the future there 
won’t be a need for further payments to someone in the public sector. The second key 
assumption is that a firm’s bargaining power vis-à-vis bureaucrats is decreasing in the level of 
investment that the firm commits to, while this is less of a problem for lobbyists facing 
politicians. This means that at higher levels of development, lobbying will tend to be the 
dominant method of influence while bribing will tend to dominate at low levels of 
development where bribes are relatively inexpensive. It is easy to see that this theoretical 
framework produces important and testable implications. The first is that lobbying and 
corruption should be negatively related: a firm that chooses to bribe bureaucrats in order to 
exert influence should be less likely to be involved in lobbying. Secondly, lobbying should be 
relatively more important as an instrument of influence for bigger firms or firms in more 
developed countries while corruption should be more likely for smaller firms or firms in less 
developed countries.  
Harstad and Svensson (2005) do not explicitly discuss the effect of political stability 
but it is easy to see that in their framework high political instability should make lobbying less 
effective. This is because in any political system where governments change relatively often, 
any concession obtained from the current government is fragile and liable to be overturned by 
different politicians unless they are lobbied again. Thus, the lack of commitment problem 
attributed to bribing would also become a problem in the context of lobbying.
5 
A second contribution that studies the relationship between corruption and lobbying is 
that by Damania et al. (2004). The crucial distinction with the Harstad and Svesson (2005) 
approach is that here corruption and lobbying are viewed as complements, not substitutes. 
More specifically, the idea is that lobbying is not done in order to change the rules favorably, 
                                                 
5 Hoff et al. (2005) provide a similar rationale. They argue, within the context of transition countries, 
that political stability is more conducive to corruption because investments in connections with 
politicians have bigger payoffs if these politicians are likely to remain in power. Clearly, this also 
applies to lobbying.    
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thus making bribing unnecessary, but it is done to persuade politicians to underinvest in law 
enforcement, thus making bribing easier. This means that, contrary to the previous 
framework, firms that choose to bribe bureaucrats are also more likely to exercise influence 
through lobbying. With respect to stability, the prediction is again very different. Here, 
unstable political systems are more likely to generate lobbying. The mechanism is that firms 
feel more threatened by instability as they worry that future governments will be keener to 
enforce the law. Since law enforcement requires significant investments, lobbying for 
underinvestment today will significantly undermine any future government’s law enforcement 
efforts. 
              We investigate these alternative theories by focusing on firms' decisions to join trade 
associations or lobby groups, interpreted as a proxy for their decision to lobby politicians. 
This allows us to go further in our empirical analysis than Damania et al. (2004) since they 
don’t have a direct measure of lobbying activity.  In addition, we can also directly test some 
other theoretical claims. For instance, Olson (1965) argues that lobby groups are more likely 
to form when free riders are easier to detect and discourage. Another aspect we investigate is 
motivated by the Grossman and Helpman’s model (1994), which implies that pressure from 
international competition varies by sectors of activity and, thus, different sectors show 
different propensities to lobby (for protection).
6 
With specific reference to business lobbies, the first issue implies that lobby groups 
are more likely to form in more concentrated sectors. By the same reasoning, larger firms 
would be more willing to join a lobby. On the other hand, smaller firms could have more 
benefits from joining a lobby because they have fewer means of direct influence on political 
institutions. In our empirical analysis, we try to determine which of these two opposite effects 
                                                 
6 See Goldberg and Maggi (1999) for empirical evidence. Solanko (2003), referring to a theoretical 
extension by Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2002) of the Grossman and Helpman (1994) framework, 
argues that small and medium firms and those who are “winners” in sectors where entry is relatively 
easy should be the least likely to lobby.      
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is more important.  Following Grossman and Helpman (1994), one can also conjecture that 
sector of activity significantly affects the decision to lobby: different sectors show different 
propensities to lobby for protection from foreign competition. As this threat is admittedly 
difficult to measure empirically, we favor the use of sector indicator variables as an important 
control. 
Naturally, there are other intervening factors in a firm's decision to join a lobby group. 
An issue that has received little attention is the direct impact of political institutions on lobby 
formation. We conjecture that the number of veto players in the political system has a positive 
influence on a firm's decision to lobby.  In political systems with many veto players such as 
parliamentary systems, where coalition governments are common, firms are less likely to 
have direct access to all those players relative to a system where the number of players it 
needs to influence is small. Therefore, a professional organization such as a lobby that can 
pool resources and coordinate influence is more likely to be effective.   
In principle, the decision to join a trade association may not be entirely due to 
expectations about the association’s or the lobby’s actual ability to influence politicians or 
bureaucrats. For example, since we don’t have information about the costs a firm has to pay to 
join, it is conceivable that if these were low, then firms would join simply to enjoy other 
benefits, such as networking.
7  We can get a handle on these issues by analyzing whether 
firms who do join lobby groups feel more or less capable of influencing different policy 
makers. This is important because for developed economies, there is a consensus that 
lobbying is an effective instrument for influencing policy makers. However, as far as less 
developed countries are concerned, one might conjecture that the effectiveness of lobby 
groups might still be low vis-à-vis the effectiveness of the more direct kind of influence that 
                                                 
7 See Olson (1965) for a discussion of these secondary benefits that lobby groups bring to their 
membership.  
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corruption can provide. Our results below show that this intuition is incorrect and that special 
interest groups are an important instrument of influence in transition countries.
8 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
In this section, we describe the main features of the data set and of the econometric 
methodology we use to test the hypotheses outlined above. Our main data source is the 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (hereafter, BEEPS). This is a 
survey of firms that was conducted in 1999 by the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) and The World Bank. It covers a total of 3954 firms in 25 transition 
countries which were surveyed through face-to-face interviews with firm managers and 
owners.
9 
The 25 countries, with the number of firms interviewed (in parenthesis), are as 
follows: Albania (163), Armenia (125), Azerbaijan (137), Belarus (132), Bosnia (127), 
Bulgaria (130), Croatia (127), Czech Republic (149), Estonia (132 ), Georgia (129), Hungary 
(147), Kazakhstan (132), Kyrgyzstan (166),  Latvia (112),  Lithuania (136), Macedonia (136),  
Moldova (139 ), Poland (246), Serbia and Montenegro  (65), Romania (125), Russia (552), 
Slovakia (138), Slovenia (125), Ukraine (247) and Uzbekistan (126). 
In order to ensure representativeness, statistical offices in each country were contacted 
and the total number of firms by industry and number of employees were obtained.
10 
Information was also collected from the statistical offices on the share of each industrial 
sector in Gross Domestic Product so that, for each country, the composition of the firms in the 
sample reflects differences in the relative shares of each sector in GDP as well as their size 
distribution.  This can be seen, for example, in the fact that almost 50% of the Bulgarian firms 
                                                 
8 Frye (2002) makes a similar point but his study focuses solely on Russia. 
9  The BEEPS data set is available on-line at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/beeps/ 
10  The sample is representative of firms operating in the formal sector and thus having a registration 
number with the central authorities (in other words, it excludes those in the informal sector, and grey 
or second economy). The samples were drawn for each country independently.   
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interviewed operate in manufacturing, while about 40% of those firms interviewed in the 
Czech Republic operate in the service sector.  
Central to our analysis is the data on lobby membership and corruption from the 
BEEPS database. On the former, firms were asked whether or not they were a member of a 
trade association or lobby group at the time of the interview.
11 A positive answer was coded 
“1,” while the value of zero was given to a negative answer. On average, about a quarter of 
the firms in our sample said they were members of a lobby group (see Table 1). The relatively 
large standard deviation indicates that these figures may vary considerably across countries. 
Figure 1 plots country averages against the level of per capita GDP (the source for the latter is 
the Penn World Tables, Version 6.1 and the data refers to the log of per capita GDP at 
purchasing power parity for the year of the survey, 1999). From Figure 1, Hungary and 
Slovenia have very high proportions of firms that are members of lobby groups (77% and 
67%, respectively), while Azerbaijan and the Kyrgyz Republic are among those with the 
lowest percentages (6% and 8%, respectively).
12 Figure 1 also suggests that there is a positive 
correlation between lobby membership and per capita GDP, which can be confirmed from 
Table 2. However, this correlation is not particularly high, at around 0.2. 
                                                 
11 It is also possible that firms lobby directly in addition or as opposed to lobbying indirectly through a 
trade association or lobby group. Unfortunately, our data does not contain information on this. Note 
also that, unfortunately, the question as phrased does not separate trade associations from lobby groups 
when it is not unreasonable to expect that their effects may differ as the latter tend to be more focused 
(contrast say an environmental lobbying group with a trade association that lobbies for a broad range 
of issues that are of interest to their membership). Finally, note that “membership” seems to be the 
standard way of proxying for lobbying in the empirical literature (Potters and Sloof, 1996.)  
12 It should be mentioned that although for some countries membership in trade associations is 
mandatory, we do not observe 100% membership in our data. This may be caused, inter alia, by weak 
enforcement or rapidly changing legislation. For example, in 1999 the Hungarian government changed 
the Law on Chambers of Economy and Commerce, thus abolishing mandatory membership. For the 
sake of robustness, we re-estimated all models reported in tables 3 and 4 below without the Hungarian 
and Slovenian firms and find that our main results were unaffected (these are available from the 
authors upon request). Admittedly, it is a deficiency of this data set that information on lobbying is 
restricted to firm membership, and does not include values of membership fees, whether it is 
voluntary, the matter of political campaign contributions, and frequency of meetings. Given that this is 
a common deficiency of the empirical literature on lobbying, future research would do well in 
studying these aspects.  
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We use two different sources to create two different measures of corruption. The 
measures differ in that one captures our firms’ experience with corruption in each country, 
while the other reflects aggregate, country-level, views on the extent of corruption. The firm-
level corruption measure is originally from the BEEPS data base. In our analysis, it is a 
dummy variable that was coded “1” if the firm answered that firms “like yours” typically pay 
10% or more of total revenue per annum in unofficial payments to public officials (and zero, 
otherwise).
13 As shown in Table 1, on average 60% of the firms in our sample believe that 
this is indeed the case in their particular countries and industries. As shown in Figure 2, there 
is substantial variation in these answers, with more than 80% of Serbian firms saying that it is 
common that more than 10% of annual revenue is earmarked to bribes and other illegal 
payments, while “only” 40% of firms in Albania believe this to be the case.  Figure 2 also 
suggests that there is a (surprisingly) positive correlation between firm-level corruption and 
per capita GDP, although the value of the pair-wise correlation coefficient value is very low, 
at about 0.05 (Table 2).
14 
Our second measure of corruption is an aggregate (country-level) measure that has 
been used in related empirical research (e.g., Damania et al. 2004). Its source is the Nations in 
Transit report from The Freedom House (2000).
15 These rankings are based on detailed 
reports for each country on nine different areas, corruption being one of them. The Freedom 
House corruption rankings reflect the perception of corruption in the civil service, the 
business interests of top policy makers, laws on financial disclosure and conflict of interest, 
                                                 
13 The cut-off value of 10% is admittedly arbitrary. In its defense, we offer that this threshold was 
chosen for this categorical variable as a rough estimate of expected rates of return to investment in the 
“average sector in the average country”: if firms have to pay such a high percentage of revenues in 
unofficial payments to public officials it may be difficult for them to break-even. With this concern in 
mind, we have re-coded this variable by lowering as well as by increasing this threshold and we have 
also tried using dummy variables for each category (of percentage of revenue) but none of these affect 
qualitatively the results reported in the next section. 
14 It is, however, statistically significant at the 5 percent level.   
15 Notice that this variable differs from the often used Freedom House ratings for Political Rights and 
Civil Liberties in that this corruption measure is continuous, that is, it is not a categorical variable. The 
data is available on-line at http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/nattransit.htm  
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and the efficacy of anticorruption initiatives. The Freedom House specialists, on the basis of 
these reports (notice that the individual country reports are also available on-line), rate each 
country on a one-to-seven scale, with one representing the lowest and seven the highest level 
of corruption.  The average for the countries in our sample, concurring with our other measure 
of corruption, is rather high at about a score of 5 in year 1999. As it can be seen in Figure 3, 
Serbia and Russia were the most corrupt countries in our sample in 1999 with both scoring 
6.5, while Slovenia is the country ranked least corrupt in 1999, having a score of 2.  It is also 
clear from the Figure that there is a negative relationship between aggregate corruption and 
per capita GDP with a correlation coefficient of around -.7. Notice that this is one of the 
highest correlations in Table 2 (the other is the one between this aggregate measure of 
corruption and our aggregate measure of political instability, discussed below) suggesting that 
country-level data may mask important features of corruption and have led analysts to believe 
that corruption would be the preferred method of influence in poorer countries.  
Our measures of influence reflect firms’ perceptions in four different spheres: over the 
executive branch of government, legislative, ministries and regulatory agencies. The source is 
again the 1999 BEEPS data base. The pair-wise correlation coefficients among these four 
variables are very high (see Table 2). This is an interesting finding in itself. It suggests that if 
was true firms favor direct methods of influence, we would observe low coefficients because 
it would be prohibitively expensive (especially for the small firms that are a majority in our 
sample) to exert influence in all these four areas simultaneously. We obtain the opposite 
result, thus suggesting that lobbying may be playing an important role (in what follows we 
investigate how important this role actually is, in absolute terms and vis-à-vis corruption).  
We must emphasize that the availability of data on perceived influence on these four 
spheres is very important for the credibility of our results. A critic may well argue that the use 
of such measure of influence bias our results against corruption because while lobbying is 
important with respect to policy makers, corruption is important vis-à-vis “policy-enforcers,”  
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that is, agencies that implement and enforce policies. In this paper we can differentiate their 
effects vis-à-vis the executive, legislative, ministries and regulatory agencies. We think it is 
reasonable to think of the first two as “policy-makers” and of the last two as “policy-
enforcers.” As we will show below, for none of these our spheres, our firms report corruption 
as more effective than lobbying.   
For all four of these spheres of influence, our measure is a binary variable coded 1 if 
the firm answered “influential”, “frequently influential” or “very influential” to the following 
question:  “When a new law, rule, regulation, or decree is being discussed that could have a 
substantial impact on your business, how much influence does your firm typically have at the 
national level of government to try to influence the content of that law, rule, regulation or 
decree?” It is coded zero if the firm answers “never influential” or “seldom influential.”
16  
Table 1 shows that the averages of all our four measures of influence are not very high 
and are similar in size (between 25% and 30% of the firms perceive themselves as 
influential). Again, this conceals large variations across countries. For example, in the case of 
influence over the executive, while around 60% of the firms in Croatia see themselves as 
influential, only 8% of them would say the same in Belarus. In the case of influence over the 
legislative, although around 40% of the firms in Slovakia see themselves as influential, only 
5% of them would say so in Azerbaijan. Finally, while in Latvia almost 60% of the firms see 
themselves as influential vis-à-vis the regulatory agencies, that same figure for firms in 
Hungary does not reach 15%. Unexpectedly, firms that see themselves as influential, tend to 
do so for all four areas at the same time.  
From the BEEPS data set, we get various auxiliary variables to capture different 
characteristics of the firms. These are the year in which the firm started production, the size of 
                                                 
16  A critic may charge that transforming such a rich categorical variable into a dummy variable in this 
fashion may entail a costly loss of information. We justify this choice by arguing that attention to the 
possibility of endogeneity bias are central in our analysis and such a loss of information is needed to 
jointly estimate our influence, lobbying and corruption equations in what follows. With this concern in 
mind, however, we have also re-estimated our single “influence equations” by ordered probit but we 
find that this does not affect qualitatively the results reported in the next section.  
  12
the firm in terms of full-time employees,
17 whether or not any state agency has a disclosed 
financial stake in the firm, whether or not any foreign-owned firm (or government) has a 
disclosed financial stake in the firm, and whether or not the firm headquarters are located in 
the capital city. An additional hypothesis we test is regarding the effect of a parliamentary 
system on the probability of a firm being a lobby member. The Database on Political 
Institutions (DPI) provides data on this issue.
18 Basic statistics, pair-wise correlations, 
description and sources of these auxiliary variables are provided in Tables 1 and 2.   
  As discussed in the previous section, in addition to features of the political system, we 
are also interested in understanding the role of political instability on the probability of an 
individual firm being a member of a lobby group. In order to capture political instability, we 
use a similar approach to the one for corruption in that we again construct both firm-based 
and country-level measures. The former is from the BEEPS data base and is coded 1 if a firm 
answered “predictable” to “how predictable are changes in rules, laws or regulations, which 
materially affect your business?” and 0 otherwise.  As it can be seen from Table1, 
approximately 28% of the firms in our sample indicated that such changes are predictable. 
Our other measure for political stability (now at the country level) is the one used by Damania 
et al. (2004) and its source is Kaufmann et al. (1999). It captures the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown. It takes values from –2.5 to 2.5, where a 
higher value represents greater political stability. The average for our sample is approximately 
zero, however these values range from 1.3 for Hungary to about -1.4 for Serbia and 
Montenegro.  
We now turn to the econometric methodology. There are two main questions of interest: 
(a) what are the factors that determine the likelihood of a firm being a member of a lobby 
                                                 
17  Samples reflect the sectoral and size distribution of firms in each country. Therefore, most firms are 
small and medium enterprises, with less than 50 full-time employees in 1999. 
18  See Beck et al. (2001) for more details. The DPI data is available on-line at 
http://www.worldbank.org/research/bios/pkeefer/DPI2000_distributed.zip  
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group? And (b) what is the relative role of corruption and lobby membership in explaining the 
probability of a firm seeing itself as influential vis-à-vis government laws, regulations and 
policies? As noted above, the dependent variable in both cases is a dichotomous variable. In 
question (a), it takes the value of 1 if the firm is a lobby member and of zero if not. In 
question (b) it takes the value of 1 if the firm perceives itself as influential, zero otherwise.  
An appropriate econometric methodology in this case is maximum likelihood probit 
estimation.  In what follows, we first estimate the probit equation: 
) ( ) 1 ( 4 3 2 1 0 ic c ic ic ic ic ic V GDP Ownerfor Ownerpriv Age FS lobby P π β β β β β + + + + + Φ = =         (1) 
where lobbyic is a binary variable indicating whether firm i in country c is a member of a 
lobby group; FSic  is firm size (measured in number of full-time employees); Ageic  is the year 
the firm started to operate; Ownerprivic  is whether the firm has private owners; Ownerforic  is 
whether the firm has foreign owners; GDPc  is real per capita GDP in the country in which the 
firm is located; Vic is a vector of auxiliary control variables (including measures of corruption 
and of political instability); and Φ is the cumulative standard normal distribution function.  
  As noted, although most of our auxiliary variables can be treated as exogenous in our 
lobby equation, the introduction of (any of our two measures of) corruption raises concerns 
about the possibility of endogeneity bias. We use the Rivers and Vuong (1988) specification 
test to assess this potential problem. The test is based on the following system of equations:  
Y1 = F(x1, θ)  +  v       (2) 
Y2 = H(Y1, x2, θ) + u 
where F and H denotes the particular functional form for the probit. The test is conducted by 
including the residual from the first-stage equation, that is, the regression on Y1, in the model 
for Y2 (the second equation). Therefore, we estimate   Y2= H(Y1, x1, θ, v) + e and specify the 
null hypothesis as α=0, where α is the coefficient on v. Accordingly, we could not reject the 
hypothesis of exogeneity for a number suspected variables in this model, principally 
corruption  (a full discussion of these results is provided in section 4 below). This means that  
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a single-equation standard probit is the appropriate estimator when looking at the 
determinants of lobby membership in our sample. However, we did not obtain similar success 
with this test for our second model (which examines the joint roles of lobbying and corruption 
on firms’ perceived influence).   
The second model we estimate is the following probit equation: 
) ( ) 1 ( 1 0 ic ic ic ic W Corrupt lobby inlfuence P η δ δ + + Φ = =     (3) 
where influence ic  is a binary variable indicating whether firm i (in country c) perceives itself 
as influential vis-à-vis four different spheres (as noted above, executive, legislative, ministry 
and regulatory agency); lobbyic is the binary variable defined above; Corruptic is our measure 
of corruption (which can be country-level or alternatively firm-based); Wic  is a vector of 
auxiliary control variables (including per capita GDP, firm ownership, headquarters location 
and measures of political instability); and Φ is the cumulative standard normal distribution 
function.  
  In this second model we are concerned about the potential endogeneity of lobby 
membership as well as of corruption. The issue concerns the possibility that (at least) one of 
the explanatory variables in the influence equation (i.e., corruption or lobbying) is 
endogenous: firms may be more likely to join lobby groups if and when such groups are 
perceived to be influential (or if the government is perceived to be sensitive or amenable to 
influence). Wald exogeneity tests were carried out and although they fail to reject the 
assumption of exogeneity of corruption, they do reject the assumption of exogeneity for 
lobbying membership.   It is therefore important to address the possibility that the probit 
estimates might be inconsistent. In order to take this issue into account, we apply the Newey's 
(1987) efficient two-step minimum chi-squared estimator.
19 In a nutshell, in what follows we 
estimate the influence equation (equation 3) treating corruption as an exogenous variable and 
                                                 
19 This econometric approach has been used in many other areas of empirical research, as for instance 
in Ribar (1994) and more recently in McKenzie and Rapoport (2004).  
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lobbying as an endogenous variable. We do the latter by using equation (1) as the first-stage 
regression. 
 
4.  Results 
In this section, we present the econometric results for the hypotheses discussed in section 2 
using the data and methodology from section 3. We begin by discussing Table 3 which shows 
our probit estimates for the determinants of a firm's decision to join a lobby group.
20 There are 
a number of important results. In terms of the firm characteristics, our results show that the 
number of full-time workers (firm size) has a significant and positive impact on the decision 
to join a lobby group. The marginal effect is considerable. The firm being of a large size 
increase the probability of being a lobby member by between 15% (in column 1) and 17% (in 
the remaining columns of Table 3). As discussed in section 2, there are contrasting theoretical 
arguments for the relationship between firm size and the decision to join a lobby. Our result 
favors the Olsonian argument that lobby groups with larger (and thus fewer) members are 
more effective, but it is also compatible with the view expounded in Solanko (2003) and 
Hellman and Kauffman (2002) that in transition economies lobbying is effective mostly for 
large firms.
21   
Our analysis also shows that if the firm is foreign-owned it is more likely to be a 
member of a lobby group. On average, for all our specifications, if a firm has foreign 
shareholders, the probability of joining a lobby group increases by around 8%. This is a 
statistically large and economically meaningful effect. This is intuitive since foreign owners 
are likely to be from more developed economies where corruption is much less common and 
                                                 
20 Note that results from the linear probability model as well as those imposing clustered (country) 
standard errors are qualitatively similar to those reported below.  
21 Solanko (2003) also predicts that lobbying be less likely amongst high performing firms in sectors 
where entry is relatively simple. Our data does not allow us to test this hypothesis since we don’t have 
measures of barriers to entry.  
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lobbying may be the preferred instrument of influence so that the management of these firms 
is more likely to pursue the same methods.
22  
The results obtained with respect to the level of economic development are compatible 
with those in Bischoff (2003) who shows that, among OECD countries, this is a significant 
factor in the decision to join a lobby. The elasticity of lobby membership with respect to per 
capita GDP is large (9% to 13%) in all specifications in which the variable is statistically 
significant. The result also confirms the Harstad and Svensson (2005) prediction that lobbying 
is positively associated with the level of economic development. This is important because it 
also indicates that the switch from corruption to lobbying as a major method of influence 
seems to be already occurring within less developed countries, not after full development has 
been achieved, as one might conjecture.
23 When we introduce our country-level measure of 
corruption (from Freedom House) this result disappears due to the high (inverse) correlation 
between the two variables. Yet the result remains when we use the firm-level (from BEEPS) 
measure of corruption. We also find that whether a firm has private sector owners or not does 
not significantly affect the probability of joining a lobby. This might sound surprising at first 
but is compatible with Frye (2002)’s evidence on Russia, which suggests that the distinction 
between private and public ownership does not matter so much for lobbying national policy 
makers.
24 The results also show that firms located in the capital city are more likely to be 
members of lobby groups.
25 
                                                 
22 Unfortunately, the questions on the percentage of ownership and on the nationality of the foreign 
owner were almost never answered in this survey.     
23 Despite the high pair-wise correlations involving our country-level measure of corruption, 
multicollinearity does not seem to be a severe problem in this case. The largest Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) is around 5, which is well below the conventional critical value of 10. 
24 Frye (2002) presents evidence that ownership structure matters for lobbying policy makers at 
regional level. Our data does not allow us to make the distinction between national and local policy 
makers. 
25 There is previous empirical evidence (e.g. Sobel and Garrett 2002) that firms located in centers 
where policy decisions are made tend to lobby more. One issue this raises is whether firms locate in 
capital cities for lobbying purposes. Further, there is also concern about the possibility of corruption 
being endogenous to the decision of joining a lobbying group. Our exogeneity tests indicate we can 
not reject the hypotheses that each of these two variables is exogenous. The p-value of this test is .806  
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Our most important findings concern the effects of corruption on the decision to join a 
lobby group.  We find that corruption has a negative and significant impact, while political 
stability has a positive and significant impact on the decision to join a lobby.
 As discussed in 
the previous section, various exogeneity tests were conducted and we could not reject the 
hypotheses that corruption (whichever way we measured it) is exogenous for all specifications 
(Table 3). The result is that the effect of corruption on lobby membership is direct, negative 
and economically meaningful. A country experiencing change from being non-corrupt to 
being corrupt yields a decrease in the probability of being a lobby member of about 3% and a 
similarly sized effect obtains for our firm-level measure of corruption. Indeed, it is remarkable 
that this marginal effect is very much same in the three specifications in Table 3 for which the 
coefficient on corruption is statistically significant.
26 
This negative and significant impact of corruption on lobbying is compatible with the 
Harstad and Svensson (2005) framework because they suggest that corruption and lobbying 
are substitutes and that political stability does encourage further lobbying.  How does this 
reconcile with the Damania et al. (2003) results who suggest otherwise? First of all, we note 
that while their theoretical model finds a positive relationship between political instability and 
judicial inefficiency (and thus, corruption) through the lobbying activity of firms that ask 
governments to underinvest in law enforcement, their empirical data can only capture the 
direct link between political instability and judicial inefficiency but not how these relate to 
lobbying. It is therefore quite conceivable that political instability leads to judicial 
inefficiency through other mechanisms or even directly. For example, countries where 
governments change frequently may end up having underinvestment in law enforcement 
                                                                                                                                                          
for our firm-level corruption measure, .9596 for our country-level corruption measure, and .3475 for 
the firm’s headquarter location.  
26 These results are robust to the presence of sector fixed-effects. Notice, however, that the latter vary 
quite a bit across specifications. With this caveat in mind, manufacturing and financial services tend to 
carry positive and statistically significant coefficients. Because these involve mostly tradable sectors, 
these results can be seen as supporting the Grossman and Helpman (1994) lobbying for protection 
argument.  
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simply because different governments do make investments in law enforcement but these are 
incompatible with each other. In other words, our results lead us to believe that Damania et al. 
(2003) discovers a link between political instability and corruption but suggests that lobbying 
by firms may not be the relevant mechanism. It is also very important to note that contrary to 
Damania et al. (2003) we have access to disaggregated measures of (perceived) stability and 
corruption, not just country-level measures. Indeed, our results hold for both firm level and 
country level measures of corruption and stability, even though table 2 shows them to be 
highly uncorrelated with each other.
 This is not entirely surprising: Svensson (2003) has 
shown how country level measures of corruption can be quite misleading in measuring the 
extent to which a given firm perceives the level of corruption it deals with.  
With respect to our pair of measures of political stability, we emphasize that while at 
the country level we have a measure of government turnover, at the firm level, we have a 
measure of how predictable firms perceive policy changes to be.
27 These are obviously 
different things, although both capture important notions of stability. The magnitude of these 
effects is considerable: focusing on the firm level data, a firm that perceives that over 10% of 
revenue per year has to pay corrupt officials is on average 3% less likely to join a lobby group 
while a firm that perceives policy to be stable is on average 3.5% more likely to join a lobby 
group.
 The magnitude of these effects for country level variables is similar. 
Another important result is that the characteristics of national political institutions 
have a positive impact on the likelihood of being a lobby member. Table 3 shows that in 
countries with a parliamentary system, firms are more likely to join lobby groups. We 
conjecture that this is because the number of veto players tends to be greater in parliamentary 
than presidential systems.
28 This effect is strong: firms in parliamentary systems are on 
                                                 
27 It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine a broader array of political instability issues. Future 
research should study the role of events such as coups, civil wars, riots and government purges.   
28 See Persson and Tabellini (2003) for a discussion of the relationship between government structure 
and veto players.  
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average 15% more likely to join a lobby group. The magnitude of this effect suggests that 
future research would do well to further investigate this connection. 
In sum, we find that both firm characteristics and institutional features of the country 
in which these are located contribute to explain lobby membership. On the former, we 
identify that firm age, size and ownership significantly increase the likelihood of a firm being 
a lobby member in a transition country, while the same effect is evident if the country in 
which the firm is located has a parliamentary system, and is politically stable. In all cases 
(with the exception of the regression where we account for aggregate corruption and political 
instability), we can also add that the likelihood of being a lobby member decreases with the 
level of corruption (which suggests that these are substitutes). 
Let us now turn to the determinants of aggregate influence. Tables 4a-4d reports these 
results which are ascertained on four different public sector institutions: the chief executive, 
legislature, ministries and regulatory agencies. We present results both for a standard probit 
model and for the instrumental variable probit model discussed in the previous section. The 
latter allows us to address the issue of potential joint determination that seems to affect the 
lobby membership and influence variables. Although we could never reject the hypothesis 
that corruption is exogenous,
29 the hypothesis that lobbying is exogenous was rejected for all 
cases. It is thus wise to instrument for lobbying and to do that, we use those in Table 3 as 
first-stage regressions in this case. In what follows, we report the coefficients from both the 
single-equation and the simultaneous-equation probit so that the comparison between the 
relative effects of corruption and lobbying on political influence can be examined in full.  
Focusing first on the results for lobbying, we find a positive, statistically significant 
and economic meaningful relation between lobby membership and perceived influence for all 
four targets. For instance, an increase in 1% on the probability of being a lobby member 
                                                 
29 For instance, the p-values from a Wald test of exogeneity for our country-level corruption measure 
in each of the four spheres (in Table 4) is as follows:  .959, .606, .997, .616. The same p-values for 
lobby membership are about .0001 in all cases.  
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increases perceived influence on the executive by 16% (using the specification in column 1 of 
Table 4a), while the effect of corruption is not statistically significant.
30 This result seems to 
confirm that firms who join lobby groups do so, at least in part, in order to gain influence. 
Interestingly however, the effect seems to be weaker for influence with regulatory agencies 
(table 4d), further confirming the suspicion that lobbying tends to focus on policy makers, not 
on those who execute policies. One may conjecture that the preferred mean of influence on 
those who execute policies is corruption. Yet, our results do not support this alternative view. 
Indeed, our analysis does not point to a significant impact on aggregate influence of the level 
of corruption in the country (the result holds irrespective of the estimator or the measure of 
corruption we use).
31  One of our main results indeed is that lobbying seems a much more 
effective mean of exerting influence than corruption. Tables 4a to 4d report 16 different 
coefficients of corruption on influence and not a single one of them is statistically significant. 
This contrasts sharply with our results for lobbying in which all but one of the coefficients is 
statistically significant. Further, in terms of their relative magnitude, the marginal effects from 
lobbying are on average 10-fold those from corruption, suggesting that this relative effect is 
considerable.
32 It is important to keep in mind that these results obtain in a set of countries for 
which it is widely held that corruption levels are very high. 
With respect to the other variables of interest, we find that private ownership has a 
negative impact on perceived influence, as publicly owned firms are clearly closer to state 
institutions. Interestingly, foreign ownership is also positively correlated with perceived 
influence although the evidence is somewhat stronger for the executive than for the other 
                                                 
30 As before, because of the high correlations observed with our country-level corruption measure, we 
computed the variance inflation factors. The maximum values are again around 5, which is well below 
the conventional critical value of 10.  
31 Despite the high correlations involving our country-level measure of corruption, multicollinearity 
does not seem to be a severe problem here. The largest Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for the single-
equation probits is 4.32 (for the country-level measure of corruption in the regulatory agency 
equation), which is well below the conventional critical value of 10. 
32 Given the frailty of the results on corruption, it is not surprising that interaction terms between our 
corruption measures and lobbying membership are never statistically significant.  
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branches. This may suggest that in order to attract foreign investment, governments are 
particularly attentive to requests from foreign investors. 
The one factor other than lobbying that seems to consistently explain influence well is 
the firm-level measure of political stability, which is always significantly associated with 
influence (while our country-level measure is not). This may suggest that the effect of this 
kind of predictability is indirect and works mostly through the lobbying channel. 
Interestingly, we do not find significant evidence of a link between levels of development (as 
measured by per capita GDP) and perceived aggregate influence. The link only seems to be 
negative and significant for the case of the executive, perhaps suggesting that high-level 
influence is not as linked to development levels as one would suspect and that much of the 
effect happens through lobbying. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper studied the determinants of lobby membership among firms, and the relative roles 
of lobbying and corruption in producing political influence. Using data for about 4000 firms 
in 25 transition economies, our results show that, as supported by previous studies, the 
decision to join a lobby group is positively correlated with firm size and economic 
development. We also show, however, that the percentage of foreign investment in the firm 
and the number of veto players in the political system have a positive influence on this 
decision. More importantly, we provide evidence compatible with our conjecture that 
lobbying is a substitute for a firm's direct means of influence with policy makers (such as 
corruption). Finally, our results indicate that firms who join a lobby see themselves as more 
able to influence decision makers thus showing that (a) a lobby group’s ability to exert 
influence is an important factor in a firm’s decision to join and (b) that while lobbying may be 
increasingly effective as a country develops (that is, becomes richer), it already matters a lot 
even in less developed (in our case, transition) countries. Our results indeed suggest that even  
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among poorer or less developed countries, firms believe that lobbying is a more effective 
mean of exerting political influence than corruption. 
As our analysis indicates, there clearly is significant scope for further research. In 
particular, our data on lobbying and corruption does not address completely how the different 
kinds of corruption and lobbying activities interact with each other. For example, we still 
don’t know exactly what lobbying actually accomplishes: our results are compatible with the 
theory that lobbying does not try to undermine law enforcement but rather tries to change 
policy directly. But this is still indirect evidence. Fortunately, some recent work has begun to 
ask some of these questions. In a very recent paper by Recanatini et al. (2005), for example, 
there is emphasis on the supply side of corruption that is mostly absent from our analysis. 
This is a step forward because it tells us what are the disaggregate characteristics that make 
specific public institutions inherently more vulnerable to corruption and why. In particular 
their results suggest that public agencies where monitoring is frequent, where procedures are 
detailed and clear and where careers within the agency are based on merit are less vulnerable 
to corruption. An equivalent analysis for the factors that affect the ability to lobby specific 
public sector institutions would go a long way in clarifying lobbying’s role in different 
societies.    
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Basic Statistics, Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
 
Variable  Mean  Std.Dev. N  Definition and Source 
Lobby membership  .2403   .427  3953 Dummy variable: 1 if firm is a member of a 
trade association or lobby group, 0 
otherwise. Source: BEEPS 1999 
Corruption firm 
level 
.605  .489  3954 Dummy variable: 1 if answers that “firms 
like yours” typically pay 10% or more of 
total revenue per annum in unofficial 
payments to public officials, 0 if less than 
10%. Source: BEEPS 1999 
Corruption 
aggregate 
4.886   1.408  3954 Country-level corruption indexes for 1999, 
varies from 1 to 7 with larger numbers 
indicating more corruption. Source: Freedom 
House (2000) 
Log GDP  8.695   .488  3954 Log of per capita Gross domestic product 
(PPP) in 1999. Source PWT 6.1 
Influence on 
Executive 
.284   .451  2920 Dummy variable coded 1 if firm answered 
“influential”, “frequently influential” or 












.295   .456  2818   Same as above to its perceived influence on 
regulatory agencies 
Year of firm 
foundation 
1987.3  18.77  3859 Year in which firm started production. 
Source: BEEPS 1999 
Private ownership  .841   .365  3954 Dummy variable: 1 if no state agency has a 
financial stake in respondent firm, 0 
otherwise. Source: BEEPS 1999 
Foreign ownership  .127   .333  3947 Dummy variable: 1 if any foreign firm has a 
financial stake in respondent firm, 0 
otherwise. Source: BEEPS 1999 
Headquarters in 
capital 
.309  .462  3954 Dummy variable: 1 if firm headquarters are 




.266  .441  3827 Dummy variable: 1 if parliamentary system 
in 1999, 0 otherwise. Source: Beck at al. 
(2001) 
Medium size firm  .285   .451  3952 Dummy variable: 1 if firm has between 50 
and 199 full time employees, 0 otherwise. 
Source: BEEPS 1999  
Large size firm  .223   .416  3952 Dummy variable: 1 if firm has between 200 
and above full time employees, 0 otherwise. 




-.0197  .678  3954 Measures perceptions of the likelihood that 
the government in power will be destabilized 
or overthrown. It takes values from –2.5 to 
2.5, where a higher value represents greater 




.2795  .448  3953 Dummy variable: 1 if firm answer "how 
predictable are changes in rules, laws or 
regulations, which materially affect your 
business?" as unpredictable, 0 otherwise. 










Pair-wise Correlation Coefficients 
 
 
                      Lobby      Corrupt   Corrupt     Log       Year    Private   Foreign   
          Member     Agg        Firm         GDP        
Corruption Agg      -0.229     
Corruption Firm     -0.002      -0.048     
Log pc GDP            0.182      -0.719       0.056     
Year found           -0.125       0.079      -0.086      -0.096  
Private           -0.067       0.007      -0.099       0.049     0.401  
Foreign            0.117      -0.093       0.002       0.062     0.029     0.088     
Capital city              0.052       0.016      -0.032     -0.125     0.001    -0.015    0.183  
Parliamentary          0.207      -0.503      -0.009      0.405     0.016    -0.054    0.081  
PolStab Aggr          0.222      -0.841        0.029      0.656    -0.078     0.003    0.099  
PolStab Firm          0.058      -0.054        0.015     -0.035    -0.085   -0.105    0.003  
Medium size firm    0.037       0.055        0.011     -0.011    -0.077   -0.208   -0.017  
Large size firm        0.139      -0.017        0.079      0.057    -0.284   -0.231    0.081  
Influence Exec        0.182      -0.026       -0.008     -0.006    -0.138    -0.168   0.071  
Influence Leg          0.211      -0.075        0.009      0.063    -0.165    -0.188   0.062  
Influence Min          0.222      -0.101        0.004      0.071    -0.189    -0.188   0.077  
Influence Reg Ag    0.171      -0.034       -0.010     0.022     -0.176    -0.183   0.061  
 
                        Capital   Parlam   PolStab   PolStab  Medium  Large   Infl      Infl     Infl 
                City                     Aggr         Firm       Size       Size   Exec     Leg    Min 
Parliamentary          0.055      
PolStab Aggr          -0.097     0.386     
PolStab Firm           0.064     0.015       0.024      
Medium size firm   -0.035    -0.057     -0.036       0.036    
Large size firm       -0.067    -0.027      0.068        0.052    -0.338  
Influence Exec        0.026      0.072       0.039       0.104     0.019    0.208     
Influence Leg          0.029      0.089      0.078        0.118     0.025    0.197   0.769  
Influence Min          0.047     0.128       0.091        0.124     0.017    0.239   0.714  0.784    






Determinants of Lobby Membership in 25 Transition Economies in 1999 
Probit Estimates 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
Year firm started operate  -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 [0.001]*  [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]**
Medium  size  firm  0.262 0.327 0.342 0.342 0.328 0.324 
 [0.061]**  [0.062]** [0.063]** [0.063]** [0.062]** [0.063]**
Large  size  firm  0.475  0.55  0.569 0.558 0.556 0.547 
 [0.069]**  [0.072]** [0.072]** [0.072]** [0.072]** [0.072]**
Private  owner  -0.032  0.054  0.074 0.07 0.043  0.052 
 [0.072]  [0.075]  [0.075]  [0.075] [0.075] [0.075] 
Foreign  owner  0.266 0.253 0.234 0.225 0.253 0.258 
 [0.068]**  [0.070]** [0.070]** [0.070]** [0.070]** [0.070]**
Headquarter  in  capital 0.149 0.147 0.138 0.154 0.144 0.138 
 [0.052]**  [0.053]** [0.053]** [0.053]** [0.053]** [0.053]**
Log per capita GDP  0.467  0.313  0.067  0.047  0.32  0.326 
 [0.052]**  [0.058]** [0.077]  [0.077] [0.058]**  [0.059]**
Parliamentary  system    0.485  0.388 0.41 0.482  0.482 
   [0.059]** [0.061]** [0.062]** [0.059]** [0.059]**
Corruption  (aggregate)     -0.127  -0.034    
     [0.026]** [0.037]    
Political Stability         0.242     
(aggregate)      [0.070]**   
Corruption  (firm-based)       -0.098  -0.099 
       [0.049]*  [0.049]* 
Political  Stability        0.119 
(firm-based)        [0.053]* 
Constant  0.758 3.396 5.912 5.502 3.506 3.236 
 [2.670]  [2.840]  [2.897]*  [2.906] [2.852] [2.850] 
Sector  dummies?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood  -1924.5  -1821.5   -1809.3   -1803.7    -1819.6  -1816.6 
Observations  3847 3721 3721 3721 3721 3720 
Note: Huber-White standard errors (adjusted for heteroskedasticity of unknown form) in  









The Determinants of Influence over Executive in 25 Transition Economies in 1999 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Probit  Probit  IV Probit  IV Probit 
      
Lobby  member  0.466 0.453 1.744 1.445 
 [0.061]**  [0.060]**  [.359]**  [.321]** 
Corruption  (aggregate)  0.012   .062  
  [0.038]   [.044]  
Corruption     -0.085    -.037 
(firm-based)   [0.053]  [.0545] 
Medium size firm  0.272  0.265  .127  .169 
 [0.068]**  [0.068]**  [.086]  [.076]* 
Large size firm  0.656  0.659  .361  .454 
 [0.076]**  [0.076]**  [.146]*  [.114]** 
Private owner  -0.296  -0.286  -.235  -.236 
 [0.074]**  [0.074]**  [.080]**  [.078]** 
Foreign owner  0.205  0.207  .113  .131 
 [0.077]**  [0.077]**  [.086]  [.084] 
Headquarter in capital  0.015  0.001  -.069  -.065 
 [0.059]  [0.058]  [.062]  [.063] 
Log per capita GDP  -0.17  -0.153  -.199  -.332 
 [0.080]*  [0.055]**  [.078]*  [.069]** 
Political Stability   0.041    -.052   
(aggregate)  [0.069]   [.068]  
Political  Stability   0.211   .1368025 
(firm-based)   [0.057]**   [.063]* 
Constant  0.57 0.48 .606 2.04 
  [0.802] [0.478]  [.812] [.625]** 
Sector  dummies?  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  2908 2907 2791 2790 
Note: Huber-White standard errors (adjusted for heteroskedasticity of unknown form) in 
brackets; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level. First-stage regressions for 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Probit  Probit  IV Probit  IV Probit 
      
Lobby  member  0.506 0.49 1.501  1.181 
 [0.060]**  [0.059]**  [.473]**  [.395]** 
Corruption  (aggregate)  0.016  .054  7  
  [0.038]  [.0458]  
Corruption     -0.046    -.019 
(firm-based)   [0.054]  [.0558] 
Medium size firm  0.244  0.234  .143  .175 
 [0.068]**  [0.069]**  [.093]  [.079]* 
Large size firm  0.572  0.57  .367  .443 
 [0.076]**  [0.076]**  [.152]*  [.116]** 
Private owner  -0.383  -0.369  -.328  -.329 
 [0.073]**  [0.073]**  [.084]**  [.079]** 
Foreign owner  0.133  0.135  .076  .092 
  [0.077] [0.077] [.0838]  [.082] 
Headquarter in capital  0.045  0.026  -.027  -.022 
  [0.059] [0.058] [.0707] [.0676] 
Log per capita GDP  0.045  0.037  -.001  -.095 
 [0.080]  [0.055]  [.079]  [.089] 
Political Stability   0.026    -.047   
(aggregate)  [0.070]   [.074]  
Political  Stability   0.252   .197 
(firm-based)   [0.057]**   [.065]** 
Constant -1.301  -1.172  -1.08  -.038 
 [0.809]  [0.479]*  [.809]  [.797] 
Sector  dummies?  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  2924 2923 2806 2805 
Note: Huber-White standard errors (adjusted for heteroskedasticity of unknown form) in 
brackets; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level. First-stage regressions for 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Probit  Probit  IV Probit  IV Probit 
      
Lobby member  0.484  0.478  1.76  1.58 
 [0.059]**  [0.059]**  [.348]**  [.294]** 
Corruption  (aggregate)  -0.043   .011  
  [0.038]   [.044]  
Corruption     -0.065    .0008 
(firm-based)   [0.054]   [.054] 
Medium size firm  0.27  0.253  .116  .138 
 [0.069]**  [0.069]**  [.086]  [.075] 
Large size firm  0.705  0.693  .393  .445 
 [0.076]**  [0.076]**  [.152]**  [.119]** 
Private owner  -0.314  -0.309  -.244  -.235 
 [0.073]**  [0.073]**  [.081]**  [.078]** 
Foreign  owner  0.142  0.145 .069 .0712 
  [0.076]  [0.077] [.079] [.0786] 
Headquarter in capital  0.09  0.086  -.0006  .0084 
 [0.059]  [0.058]  [.066]  [.064] 
Log per capita GDP  -0.014  0.053  -.069  -.1612 
  [0.081]  [0.055] [.076] [.079]* 
Political Stability   -0.033    -.129   
(aggregate)  [0.071]   [.07]  
Political  Stability   0.256   .166 
(firm-based)   [0.057]**   [.064]** 
Constant -0.692  -1.503  -.389  .395 
 [0.808]  [0.483]**  [.778]  [.734] 
Sector  dummies?  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  2942 2941 2824 2823 
Note: Huber-White standard errors (adjusted for heteroskedasticity of unknown form) in 
brackets; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level. First-stage regressions for 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Probit  Probit  IV Probit  IV Probit 
      
Lobby  member  0.426 0.4  .829 .628 
 [0.061]**  [0.061]**  [.494]*  [.392] 
Corruption  (aggregate)  0.039   .021  
  [0.038]   [.046]  
Corruption     -0.084  -.0603 
(firm-based)   [0.054]   [.057] 
Medium size firm  0.161  0.157  .122  .133 
 [0.068]*  [0.069]*  [.0827]  [.075] 
Large size firm  0.504  0.509  .445  .474 
 [0.077]**  [0.077]**  [.117]**  [.099]** 
Private owner  -0.41  -0.388  -.398  -.377 
 [0.075]**  [0.075]**  [.077]**  [.077] 
Foreign owner  0.142  0.138  .127  .129 
 [0.077]  [0.077]  [.081]  [.08] 
Headquarter in capital  0.098  0.074  .085  .076 
 [0.059]  [0.058]  [.068]  [.065] 
Log per capita GDP  0.033  -0.022  -.034  -.100 
 [0.078]  [0.055]  [.081]  [.08] 
Political Stability   0.019    -.073   
(aggregate)  [0.070]   [.077]  
Political  Stability   0.247   .225 
(firm-based)   [0.057]**   [.062]** 
Constant -1.195  -0.525  -.535  .131 
 [0.787]  [0.476]  [.839]  [.693] 
Sector  dummies?  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  2807 2806 2690 2689 
Note: Huber-White standard errors (adjusted for heteroskedasticity of unknown form) in 
brackets; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level. First-stage regressions for 
columns (3) and (4) shown in table 3.  
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Figure 1. 

















































































































Corruption (country-level) and log of per capita GDP: 25 Transition Economies, 1999 
 
 
ALB
ARM
AZE
BEL
BOS
BUL
CRO
CZE EST
GEO
HUN
KAZ KYR
LAT
LIT
MAC
MOL
POL
YUG
ROM
RUS
SLK
SLV
UKR UZB
2
3
4
5
6
C
o
r
r
u
p
t
 
F
H
5000 10000 15000
Per Capita GDP
 